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ARTICLE II COMPLICATIONS 
SURROUNDING SEC-EMPLOYED 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
THOMAS C. ROSSIDIS† 
INTRODUCTION 
The country’s top white collar defense attorneys spend a 
great deal of time arguing their cases before a Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) administrative law judge (“ALJ”).  
Even though the function of an ALJ closely resembles that of an 
Article III judge, the SEC is showing no signs of reducing 
administrative actions, as ALJs can hear evidence, decide factual 
issues, apply legal principles, and issue initial decisions at an 
accelerated rate.1  This is especially noticeable as the 
“[e]nforcement activity in the first half of fiscal year 2015 
indicates that the [SEC] is on track for another strong year of 
new enforcement actions filed.”2  This record level of enforcement 
activity by the SEC is credited to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).3  As 
a result of Dodd-Frank’s central purpose—“[t]o promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
 
† Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.S., 2012, Cornell University School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations. I thank my family for their amazing influence and unconditional 
love and support. I especially thank Professor Michael Perino for his valuable 
guidance, discussions, and comments on this Note. I also thank Lawrence Elbaum 
for his commitment, judgment, and words of encouragement and support throughout 
my legal pursuits, and Ralph Bekkevold for his advice and inspiration—their 
contributions towards my success today is highly acknowledged. 
1 Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 798–99 
(2013). 
2 Sara Gilley, Heather Lazur & Alberto Vargas, SEC Focus on Administrative 
Proceedings: Midyear Checkup, LAW 360 (May 27, 2015, 10:25 AM), http:// 
www.law360.com/articles/659945/sec-focus-on-administrative-proceedings-midyear-
checkup [hereinafter Midyear Checkup]. 
3 Id. 
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‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices”4—in 2014 alone, the SEC initiated nearly 
1,000 new investigations and filed 755 new enforcement actions.5 
Defense attorneys, however, came prepared.  In a forum 
where the SEC wins nearly 100% of the time, enforcement action 
defendants began challenging administrative proceedings against 
them in federal court.  Such defendants received a pivotal 
decision from the Northern District of Georgia in June 2015 and 
more recently in November 2015.6  In both cases, district court 
Judge Leigh Martin May found that the SEC ALJ hiring process 
was likely to be unconstitutional because the ALJs were not 
appointed by the SEC Commissioners pursuant to Article II of 
the Appointments Clause.7  Therefore, since Judge May’s initial 
decision, the SEC has been under a flurry of constitutional 
attacks, as the SEC’s breach in “its use of [ALJs] has drawn 
other defendants like moths to a flame.”8 
There are two constitutional attacks in particular that 
gained traction, both of which concern the executorial powers of 
Article II.  The first issue is whether SEC-hired ALJs are  
 
 
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
5 See Midyear Checkup, supra note 2. However, SEC administrative 
enforcement statistics were recently contested by Emory University Law Professor 
Urska Velikonja in her law review article. See generally Urska Velikonja, Reporting 
Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
901 (2016). The study concluded that “many of the SEC statistics developed to 
measure enforcement are deeply flawed” by showing that, between 2002 and 2014, 
“[t]he distortion in the defendant count” is due to the fact that a large percentage of 
defendants have been counted twice and sometimes even three or more times in the 
SEC’s statistics. Id. at 904 n.9, 977. These added actions typically included “follow-
on” enforcement actions—administrative actions that bar individuals from 
appearing before the commission who were previously found liable for SEC 
violations—and “secondary” enforcement actions—“filed simultaneously against the 
same defendant for the same misconduct in court and before the ALJ.” Id. at 935, 
935 n.197, 937. Professor Velikonja’s takeaway is that “[o]verstating enforcement 
statistics is problematic because it suggests that SEC enforcement is more vigorous 
than it really is.” Id. at 958. 
6 See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015); see also Ironridge 
Glob. IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
7 Ironridge Glob., 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1316; Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319. 
8 Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/dealbook/sec-
finds-itself-in-a-constitutional-conundrum.html. 
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considered “inferior Officers” of the United States whose 
appointment shall be in compliance with the Appointments 
Clause: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.9 
If the United States Supreme Court decides SEC ALJs are 
inferior officers, then these ALJs are unconstitutionally 
appointed because the United States Constitution limits the 
power to appoint inferior officers to three sources: “the President 
alone,” “the Heads of Departments,” and “the Courts of Law.”10  
SEC ALJs are currently hired by the dual efforts of the SEC 
Office of Human Resources and the Office of Personnel 
Management.11  Both offices conduct their duties and make 
decisions without any influence from the SEC Commissioners, 
thus making the ALJs’ appointment unconstitutional.12  In 
contrast, if the Supreme Court determines that SEC ALJs are 
mere employees, then the constitutional appointment framework 
does not affect the way ALJs are hired and the Article II 
Appointments Clause claim fails.13 
Analogous to SEC ALJs, in Freytag v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, the Supreme Court addressed whether special 
trial judges (“STJs”) are inferior officers.14  Concluding STJs are 
inferior officers because they are “established by Law” and 
 
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
10 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 
1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding that because SEC ALJs are inferior officers, the 
ALJ who presided over [the businessman’s] hearing was in conflict with the 
Appointments Clause for not being appointed by “the President, a court of law, or a 
department head”). 
11 See Notice of Filing, Timbervest, LLC, No. 3-15519 (S.E.C. June 4, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-15519-event-139.pdf. 
12 See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878. 
13 See Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. v. SEC (Lucia II), 832 F.3d 277, 286 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that SEC ALJ’s are employees, as “the Commission’s ALJs 
neither have been delegated sovereign authority to act independently of the 
Commission nor, by other means established by Congress, do they have the power to 
bind third parties, or the government itself, for the public benefit”). 
14 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 877–92. 
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“specified by statute,”15 the Court considered both the Framers’ 
intent behind the Appointments Clause—to address the 
“manipulation of official appointments”16—and the purpose of the 
Clause—to “ensure that those who wielded [the power to appoint] 
were accountable to political force and the will of the people.”17 
The second constitutional issue is whether SEC ALJs’ dual 
for-cause removal protection contravenes the Constitution’s 
separation of powers.  Article II of the Constitution provides that 
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”18  As the Supreme Court noted, 
“[James] Madison stated on the floor of First Congress, ‘if any 
power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of 
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the 
laws.’ ”19  The underlying purpose of the Clause was to maintain 
responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department, since 
“[t]he buck stops with the President.”20  In Humphrey’s Executor 
v. United States,21 the Court initially explored the issue whether 
good-cause tenure protection constitutionally extended to 
“principal” officers of independent agencies.22  It was only until 
later that Supreme Court decisions answered the question 
whether removal protections constitutionally extended to inferior 
officers.23 
The dual-layered removal protection stems from the 
protections granted to both the principal officers of the 
independent agency—the SEC Commissioners—and the inferior 
officers within those independent agencies—the ALJs.  The Court 
determined that principal officers of independent agencies shall 
only be removed by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office.”24  Yet, the issue remains whether 
inferior officers shall only be removed by principal agents for 
cause.  An argument made against SEC ALJs is that their dual-
 
15 Id. at 881. 
16 Id. at 883. 
17 Id. at 884. 
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
19 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 
(2010) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 463 (1789)). 
20 Id. at 492–93. 
21 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
22 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493. 
23 Id. at 494–95. 
24 Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620). 
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layer removal protection would unconstitutionally interfere with 
the President’s control over inferior officers.  In Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,25 the 
Supreme Court addressed this separation of power issue and 
found that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”), whose members are inferior officers, 
unconstitutionally interfered with the President’s ability to 
“ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.”26 
This Note argues, first, that SEC ALJs are inferior officers 
pursuant to Article II’s Appointments Clause, and second, that 
SEC ALJs’ multilevel tenure protection is constitutional.  
Because Supreme Court precedent determined that inferior 
officers are “established by Law,”27 hold statutory duties and 
compensation,28 exercise “significant authority,”29 and operate 
under the supervision of an officer appointed by the President 
with the consent of the Senate,30 SEC ALJs are inferior officers, 
rather than mere employees.  Furthermore, since the Supreme 
Court also concluded that inferior officers are endowed with 
removal protection as it is “deem[ed] best for the public 
interest,”31 notwithstanding the narrow PCAOB ruling in Free 
Enterprise Fund,32 SEC ALJs’ dual-layer protection is not suspect 
of affecting the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws 
of the United States. 
Part I introduces the legislation underlying both the SEC’s 
development and the ALJ hiring process, including the ALJs’ 
duties and responsibilities within the SEC’s Office of 
Enforcement.  Moreover, Part I details the framework of the 
Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit Court surrounding the Article II 
Appointments Clause issues.  Part II begins with the 
development of district court cases that first engaged this issue 
following the enactment of Dodd-Frank.  This Part also looks to 
independent agencies outside the SEC to see how those agencies 
and Congress responded to the constitutional challenges.  Part 
 
25 561 U.S. 477. 
26 Id. at 498. 
27 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991). 
28 Id. 
29 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). 
30 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). 
31 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886). 
32 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 
(2010). 
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III then determines that SEC ALJs are inferior officers and are 
subject to reappointment by SEC Commissioners.  Next, this 
Part explores a solution to safeguard the anticipated attacks on 
past and pending ALJ decisions by adopting the de facto officer 
doctrine.33  Finally, this Part concludes that SEC ALJ dual-layer 
tenure protection is constitutionally within the separation of 
powers framework. 
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF SEC-HIRED 
ALJS 
A. Integration of the Securities Exchange Act and the 
Administrative Procedure Act 
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the “Act”) established the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as the agency 
responsible for United States federal securities law.34  Acting as 
the department heads of the administrative agency, the SEC is 
composed of five commissioners (together known as the 
“Commission”) who are appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.35  The Commission is 
responsible for “appoint[ing] and compensat[ing] officers, 
attorneys, economists, examiners, and other employees” so long 
as their actions comply with § 4802 of the United State Code (the 
“Code”).36  Indeed, § 4802 of the Code indicates that the section 
shall be administered consistent with the merit system 
principles37 and for the Commission to consult with the Office of  
 
 
 
 
 
33 The Supreme Court confirmed that the doctrine “confers validity upon acts 
performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later 
discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment . . . is deficient.” Ryder v. 
United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995). 
34 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012). 
35 Id. (stating that each commissioner holds a five-year term in office). 
36 Id. § 78d(b)(1). “The Commission may appoint and fix the compensation of 
such . . . examiners[] and other employees as may be necessary for carrying out its 
functions . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 4802(b) (2012). 
37 See 5 C.F.R. § 332.402 (2016), for OPM’s referral procedure and § 332.404 for 
its order of selection criteria. See also 5 U.S.C. § 3313 (explaining the order of 
qualified applicants). 
FINAL_ROSSIDIS 2/23/2017  5:16 PM 
2016] SEC-EMPLOYED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 779 
Personnel Management (“OPM”) to incorporate their 
comprehensive data on prospective ALJ candidates in its hiring 
decisions.38 
OPM is the primary source for developing the methodology 
for ALJ examinations and is the “gatekeeper” for selecting 
ALJs;39 however, that is not meant to imply that OPM actually 
hires ALJs.40  Rather, it has the authority to (1) recruit and 
examine ALJ applicants; (2) assure appointment decisions are 
consistent with applicable laws; (3) establish classification 
standards; (4) approve personnel actions, such as promotions and 
transfers; and (5) ensure the independence of ALJs.41  
Accordingly, the appointment responsibilities of ALJs are left to 
the agency itself. 
Following the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act, 
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) in 
1946 to further ensure the goals of due process in administrative 
proceedings.42  Congress emphasized and answered the concern 
that hearing officers should hold an independent status apart 
from the hiring and prosecuting agency.43  In contemplation of 
this concern, Congress entertained two proposals:  Either 
“examiners should be entirely independent of agencies, even to 
the extent of being separately appointed,” or “examiners [should] 
be selected from agency employees and function merely as 
clerks.”44  Although Congress recognized that agencies have a 
 
38 5 U.S.C. § 4802(d)–(f). The OPM oversees federal employment for ALJs and 
other civil servants. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 19, Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 
(2d Cir. 2015) (No. 15-2103), 2015 WL 4910839, at *40. 
39 Jenna Greene, SEC Nemesis Mark Cuban Strikes Again-but on the Wrong 
Side, AM. LAW. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202737427290/ 
SEC-Nemesis-Mark-Cuban-Strikes-AgainBut-on-the-Wrong-Side. 
40 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(d). When an agency employs a new ALJ, it must reimburse 
OPM for the costs it laid out for developing and administering the ALJ examination. 
Id. § 930.203. OPM is in charge of the merit-selection process in which applicants 
take a test, and the raw points are then processed through a complicated formula to 
assess the overall score of each applicant. Then, the Chief ALJ of the hiring agency 
will receive a list of eligible candidates to choose from, Greene, supra note 39, and a 
selection is made from the top three candidates on the list. Notice of Filing, supra 
note 11. Finally, an interview committee and the Chief ALJ make a preliminary 
selection with the final approval coming from the Commission’s Office of Human 
Resources. Id. 
41 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(e). 
42 92 CONG. REC. 2149 (1946). 
43 Id. at 5655. 
44 Id. Congress was grappling with the idea that if it were to give examiners 
heightened adjudicatory power, then it would also need to make sure the examiners’ 
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legitimate part in the selection of examiners, it determined that 
“examiners are made independent in tenure and compensation.”45  
Put differently, Congress inserted a removal provision for ALJs, 
which provided that they can only be discharged “for good 
cause . . . determined by the Civil Service Commission after 
opportunity for [a] hearing.”46  Therefore, by adding these 
protections, Congress created enough distance between the 
Commission and its ALJs to satisfy the independence concern. 
In addition, though the Securities Act supplied authority to 
the Commission to delegate its functions to ALJs and other 
agency personnel,47 the Commission retained the “discretionary 
right” to review the actions of those delegated functions.48  If, 
however, the Commission was to decline its exercise to review or 
fail to make a review in a timely manner, the ALJ’s decision will 
become the final decision of the Commission.49  But even so, the 
aggrieved person has the ability to “obtain review of the order in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he [or 
she] resides or has his [or her] principle place of business, or for 
the District of Columbia Circuit.”50  Thus, this multilayered 
review process, in conjunction with a separate tenure and 
compensation structure,51 was Congress’s attempt to insulate 
ALJs from Commission influence.52 
 
appointment was separated from the agencies’ influence. Conversely, if Congress 
were to give examiners less power in the administrative proceeding process, then 
examiners might become indistinguishable from mere clerks. Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 11, 60 Stat. 237, 244 
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of title five of the U.S. Code). For 
cause is to be determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board, as set up under 
the APA. Harold J. Krent, Symposium, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within 
the Executive Branch, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083, 1108 (2015). In addition to 
their tenure protection, ALJs also have life tenure because they do not serve for a 
specific period of years in office. Barnett, supra note 1, at 807. 
47 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012); see also id. § 77u (establishing that hearings can 
be held before the Commission or officers designated by the Commission). 
48 Id. § 78d-1(b). 
49 Id. § 78d-1(c). 
50 Id. § 78y(a)(1). Such a filing to the court of appeals must be done within sixty 
days after the order becomes final. Id. 
51 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012). 
52 See 92 CONG. REC. 5656 (1946). 
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B. The Operation of the ALJ System within the SEC’s Office of 
Enforcement 
The SEC and other independent agencies are required to 
appoint as many ALJs as necessary to conduct proceedings 
efficiently and fairly.53  Currently, the SEC’s Office of 
Administrative Law Judges is composed of five ALJs.54  When the 
Commission commences an “order instituting proceeding” to hold 
an investigatory hearing,55 it directs one of the ALJs to conduct a 
public administrative proceeding to determine the truthfulness of 
the allegations.56  After the Commission designates an ALJ as an 
independent judicial officer,57 the ALJ will conduct a public 
hearing at one of multiple locations throughout the country.58 
By statute, an SEC-hired ALJ is a hearing officer,59 a 
position that carries significant authority because unless the 
Commission specifically designates a hearing to an ALJ, the 
hearing officer presiding over a matter would be the Commission 
itself or an individual Commissioner.60  Moreover, as authorized 
under the APA, ALJs must conduct themselves similarly to court 
judges during administrative proceedings or else they risk 
disqualification from the agency at any time.61  On that basis, 
ALJs are given substantial power throughout the hearing process 
to: (1) administer oaths and affirmations; (2) issue subpoenas; 
(3) rule on evidence; (4) take depositions; (5) hold settlement 
conferences; (6) demand parties’ attendance;62 and (7) issue 
sanctions.63  Though ALJs serve as finders of fact and law, “there 
is no jury[,] [and] [t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
 
53 5 U.S.C. § 3105. 
54 ALJ Initial Decisions: Administrative Law Judges, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/ 
alj/aljdec.shtml (last modified Feb. 6, 2017). 
55 17 C.F.R. § 201.101(a)(4) (2016). 
56 Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/alj (last 
modified Jan. 26, 2017). 
57 17 C.F.R. § 201.110. 
58 Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 56. 
59 17 C.F.R. § 201.101(5). 
60 See id.; see also id. § 201.110. 
61 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012). ALJs participating in the decision of the proceeding 
must operate in an “impartial manner.” Id. 
62 See id. § 556(c); see generally 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (emphasizing that no 
provision of the Rules of Practice is meant to curtail the powers of the ALJs unless it 
explicitly states to the contrary); 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (“[T]he hearing officer may 
receive relevant evidence and shall exclude all evidence that is irrelevant, 
immaterial or unduly repetitious.”). 
63 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 201.180. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.”64  Accordingly, despite 
certain similarities between the role of an ALJ and that of an 
Article III federal judge, the rules of procedure and practice vary 
significantly between the two types of proceedings. 
Above all, ALJs have the power to make initial decisions.65  
When an ALJ drafts an initial decision,66 “that 
decision . . . becomes the decision of the agency without further 
proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, 
the agency” within the time period that is provided under the 
Rules of Practice.67  If the Commission decides to review the 
initial decision, or a party petitions for review of an initial 
decision, the Commission reviews de novo and has full discretion 
to “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or remand for further 
proceedings, in whole or in part.”68  Although the Commission 
“retains ‘all the power,’ ”69 ALJ decisions should not be quickly 
dismissed as mere recommendations or advisory in nature.  After 
all, absent an appeal or an elected review by the Commission, the 
initial decision becomes the final decision without any 
modifications. 
C. The Game-Changing Impact of Dodd-Frank on SEC 
Administrative Hearings 
The administrative process, although different from Article 
III courts, was not nearly as concerning for financial individuals 
and entities until Dodd-Frank provisions were enacted in 2010.  
To incentivize the use of administrative enforcement actions, 
Dodd-Frank enabled the SEC to obtain similar remedies from 
administrative proceedings as it would from federal court 
actions, such as the imposition of monetary penalties.70 
 
64 David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1166 
(2016). 
65 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). 
66 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
67 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). Depending on a multitude of factors, such as nature, 
complexity, and urgency, the Commission will specify a time period for the ALJ to 
conduct the proceeding and file an initial decision. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2). 
Typically, ALJs will be issued either a 120, 210 or 300 day time period. Id. 
68 Id. § 201.411. The Commission provides at least some deference to the ALJ 
decision because it must consider the decision during the administrative appeal. 
Barnett, supra note 1, at 807. 
69 Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)). 
70 See Stephen Joyce, SEC To Use Administrative Cases More, Despite Defense 
Bar Complaints, Officials Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 17, 2014), http:// 
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Initially, the 1934 Act limited the SEC to imposing civil 
money penalties only on enumerated SEC-regulated entities 
without first having to seek an order from federal court.71  With 
the passage of § 929P(a) of Dodd-Frank, however, the SEC’s 
administrative powers have greatly expanded.72  Pursuant to 
that section, Dodd-Frank permits the SEC to impose civil money 
penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings brought against “any 
person” or unregistered entity.73  Nonetheless, even though the 
SEC was granted greater latitude to order both regulated and 
nonregulated entities before its ALJs, the majority of its 
proceedings continue to involve only SEC-regulated individuals 
or firms.74 
Since the inception of Dodd-Frank, the number of 
administrative proceedings has increased by fifty percent, as it 
allows almost any type of securities case to be heard before an 
SEC ALJ.75  Specifically, the number of ALJ proceedings has 
gone from 352 in 2009, pre-Dodd-Frank, to 610 in 2014.76  The 
SEC categorizes the types of matters brought before its ALJs into 
one of eleven primary classifications: (1) Broker-Dealer; 
(2) Delinquent Filings; (3) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; 
(4) Insider Trading; (5) Investment Advisors/Investment 
 
www.bna.com/sec-administrative-cases-n17179911882. But, according to Professor 
Urska Velikonja, the Commission did not bring cases before its ALJs to seek an in-
house advantage. Mike Sacks, SEC In–House Venue is Target of House Bill, NAT’L 
L.J. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202741222050/SEC-
InHouse-Venue-is-Target-of-House-Bill. In 2009, the SEC won 90.6% of its federal 
court actions. In 2010, the SEC won 92.6% of its federal court actions. And in 2011, 
though the SEC had a lower winning percentage in federal court, Professor 
Velikonja ultimately attributed that to the increase in insider-trading cases. Id. 
71 See generally Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 21–25, 48 Stat. 
881, 899–902 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)). SEC-regulated entities 
include: “broker, dealer, investment adviser, investment company, municipal 
securities dealer, government securities broker, government securities dealer, 
registered public accounting firm . . . or transfer agent.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3. 
72 Michael Volkov, Slowing Down the SEC Administrative Train, VOLKOV L. 
BLOG (Sept. 8. 2015), http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2015/09/slowing-down-the-sec-
administrative-train. 
73 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of title fifteen of the U.S. Code). 
74 Zaring, supra note 64, at 1175. 
75 Compare SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2009 TABLE 2 (2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2009.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL 2009], with SEC, 
SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2014 TABLE 2 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/ 
about/secstats2014.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL 2014]. 
76 See FISCAL 2009, supra note 75; FISCAL 2014, supra note 75. 
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Companies; (6) Issuer Reporting and Disclosure; (7) Market 
Manipulation; (8) Miscellaneous; (9) Municipal Securities & 
Public Pensions; (10) Securities Offering; and (11) Transfer 
Agent.77  Before the enactment of Dodd-Frank, “charges over 
violations to the securities laws that involved corporate officers 
or those trading on inside information had to be brought in a 
federal district court, if the agency was seeking a penalty like a 
fine or ban from serving as an officer or director of a company.”78  
This limited the types of cases that came before ALJs.  Both 
historically and presently, the three major enforcement action 
classifications brought before an ALJ are Broker-Dealer, 
Delinquent Filings, and Investment Advisors.79  In effect, Dodd-
Frank has changed the landscape of the securities industry by 
taking traditionally litigated cases out of the federal court 
system.  Parties to these administrative proceedings are not 
acquiescing as discussed herein.80 
D. Development of the Article II Issues within the United States 
Supreme Court 
1. Freytag v. Commissioner81: Defining “Inferior” Officer 
The line between inferior officers and mere employees is far 
from clear.  In the majority opinion by Justice Blackmun, the 
Freytag Court found that special tax judges are inferior officers 
whose appointments must conform to the Appointments Clause,82  
 
 
 
77 FISCAL 2014, supra note 75. 
78 Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over the Constitutionality of Some 
of Its Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://dealbook.ny 
times.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-challenges-over-the-constitutionality-of-some-of-its-
court-proceedings. 
79 See FISCAL 2009, supra note 75; SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA, FISCAL 
2010, Table 2 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2010.pdf; FISCAL 2014, supra 
note 75. 
80 The Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, Andrew Ceresney, indicated 
that “while we are using administrative proceedings more, we are still bringing 
significant numbers of contested cases in district courts. And our use of the 
administrative forum is eminently proper, appropriate, and fair to respondents.” 
Andrew Ceresney, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section 
Fall Meeting, SEC (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1370543515297. 
81 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
82 Id. at 881. 
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which declares that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment 
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”83 
In Freytag, the Court addressed where STJs fit on the 
inferior officer to mere employee spectrum.  The United States 
Tax Court is an Article I court—not an Article III court—and is 
composed of nineteen judges that are appointed by the 
Executive.84  The Chief Judge of the Tax Court is authorized by 
statute to appoint STJs and assign them to certain specified 
proceedings and, under a separate subsection, assign them to 
“any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate.”85  
The first three subsections of the statute permit the Chief Tax 
Judge not only to authorize STJs to hear and report on a case, 
but also to allow those judges to render a decision.86  Yet, the 
fourth subsection authorizes STJs only to prepare proposed 
findings, leaving the actual decisions to the Tax Court.87 
The taxpayer defendants in Freytag argued that STJs are 
inferior officers who must be appointed in compliance with the 
Appointments Clause.88  Specifically, they contended that 
because subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3) authorized STJs to issue 
actual decisions with regard to specific types of proceedings, the 
catchall phrase in subsection (4) was meant to leave only minor 
cases for them to write proposed decisions.89  The taxpayers’ 
stronger argument, however, was that STJs exercised significant 
authority even where they lacked the authority to enter a final 
 
83 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
84 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870–71. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, 
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
643 (2004), for a full discussion on the differences between Article III courts and 
Article I tribunals. On the surface, Article III judges enjoy life tenure in good 
behavior and protection from salary reductions, while Article I judges lack both 
salary and tenure protections. Id. at 646. 
85 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 871 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(b) (2012)). For purposes 
of the Freytag analysis, “the statute” refers to § 7443A(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. In 1991, the statute authorized the chief judge to assign STJs to “ ‘(1) any 
declaratory judgment proceeding,’ ‘(2) any proceeding under § 7463,’ ‘(3) any 
proceeding’ in which the deficiency or claimed overpayment does not exceed $10,000, 
and ‘(4) any other proceeding which the Chief Judge may designate.’ ” Id. at 873 
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(b)). 
86 Id. at 873 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(c)). 
87 Id. It is clear that the fourth subsection states that the “Chief Judge may 
assign ‘any other proceeding’ to a special trial judge for duties short of ‘mak[ing] the 
decision.’ ” Id. (alteration in original). 
88 Id. at 877. 
89 Id. at 876. 
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decision.90  Finally, the taxpayers asserted that such judges were 
unconstitutional because, as inferior officers, they were not 
appointed by “the President,” “the Heads of Departments,” or 
“the Courts of Law.”91 
On the other hand, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
(“CIR”) contended that, due to the all-encompassing language in 
subsection four of the statute, STJs do no more than merely 
assist the Tax Court through their opinions as recommendations 
with respect to all disputes.92  Furthermore, CIR asserted that 
the first three subsections of § 7443A(b) were meant to cover only 
minor matters, limiting STJs’ actual decision-making power to 
those minor issues.93  Accordingly, CIR defined such judges to be 
mere employees who are not subject to constitutional constraints, 
as they do not hold significant authority.94 
The Court found that CIR’s argument failed because “[t]he 
fact that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may 
be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments 
Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution.”95  
Although the Court held in favor of CIR’s broad interpretation of 
subsection (b)(4),96 it determined that regardless of whether STJs 
were restricted to making only proposed decisions under one 
subsection, the first three subsections of the statute permitted 
them to exercise independent authority, which is the hallmark of 
an inferior officer.97 
The Court ultimately concluded that STJs were inferior 
officers based on their significant “duties and discretion.”98  
Without having to distinguish the first three subsections from 
the fourth subsection, the Court found that STJs were 
 
90 See id. at 880–82. 
91 Id. at 878, 880. 
92 Id. at 880. The legislative history supports the determination that subsection 
(b)(4) was intended to remove the maximum amount in dispute to expand the 
authority of STJs. Id. at 874 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1568 (1984)). 
However, the broader coverage given to STJs came with the caveat of only being 
authorized to write proposed opinions, leaving the formal decisions to be entered by 
a tax court judge. Id. 
93 Id. at 876. 
94 Id. at 880–81. 
95 Id. at 882. 
96 Id. at 877 (holding that STJs can be assigned to any tax proceeding, 
regardless of its complexity or amount, but only to prepare a recommended opinion). 
97 See id. (noting that STJs hear and decide cases under the first three 
subsections). 
98 Id. at 881. 
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“established by Law” and their “duties, salary, and means of 
appointment” were specified by statute.99  Even more to the 
point, the Court found that STJs’ tasks—which included taking 
testimony, conducting trials, ruling on admissibility of evidence, 
and enforcing compliance with discovery orders—were 
significant.100  Accordingly, even with the discrepancy of 
authority allocated to STJs under the various subsections of 
§ 7443(b) of the Code, 101 the Court held that they exercised 
authority “inconsistent with the classifications of ‘lesser 
functionaries’ or employees.”102 
Six years later, in Edmond v. United States,103 the Supreme 
Court found that military appellate judges, specifically, judges on 
the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, were also inferior 
officers.104  Edmond expanded the bright line differences between 
officers and non-officers when it concluded that inferior officers 
have their “work . . . directed and supervised at some level by 
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.”105  Therefore, the Court 
determined that judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal—who do 
not have the power to render final decisions106—were inferior 
officers for the sole reason that their work was supervised by the 
Judge Advocate General and the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces.107 
2. Landry v. FDIC108: D.C. Circuit Court’s Interpretation of 
Freytag Decision in the Context of ALJs as Inferior Officers 
In 2000, in the context of independent agencies, such as the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided the question of whether ALJs were 
considered inferior officers.109  Similar to the Freytag Court, the 
 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 881–82. 
101 Id. at 881 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam)). 
102 Id. at 880–81 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126, 126 n.162). 
103 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
104 Id. at 666. 
105 Id. at 663. 
106 Id. at 665. 
107 Id. at 666. 
108 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
109 Id. at 1132; see also id. at 1128 (noting that the principle issue was whether 
FDIC’s appointment of the ALJ violated the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution). 
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D.C. Circuit also acknowledged that “[t]he line between ‘mere’ 
employees and inferior officers is anything but bright.”110  
However, the Landry court distinguished its conclusion from 
Freytag’s and found that ALJs are not the same as STJs and, 
therefore, were not inferior officers because they did not hold 
comparable final decision making power.111 
In Landry, the FDIC notified a senior bank officer that it 
intended to bring an order against him for conduct that 
threatened the integrity of a federally insured bank.112  The FDIC 
assigned the matter to its ALJ for a formal administrative 
hearing.113  After two weeks, the ALJ issued a proposed decision 
against the bank officer, who then appealed the ALJ initial 
decision to the FDIC Board of Directors.114  In its final decision, 
the FDIC Directors agreed with the ALJ decision and finalized 
their action against the bank officer.115  Finally, the bank officer 
appealed the final decision to the D.C. Circuit and argued that 
the FDIC’s ALJ appointment method violated the Appointments 
Clause.116 
The D.C. Circuit emphasized that, unlike the STJs in 
Freytag, who render final decisions under the first three 
subsections of § 7443(b) of the Code, FDIC ALJs recommend 
decisions to the FDIC Board, since only the FDIC Board can 
render final decisions.117  In addition, unlike the statutory 
provisions that indicate the Tax Court defers to STJ findings,118 
the court found that the FDIC makes their own factual findings 
de novo without relying solely on the ALJ’s finding.119 
 
110 Id. at 1132. 
111 Id. at 1134. 
112 Id. at 1128. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1133. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 308.40(c) (2016)). 
However, the concurring opinion made a strong argument that an ALJ’s 
recommended decision subject to de novo review is strikingly similar to the proposed 
findings and recommendations of a federal magistrate judge under the review of a 
district judge. Id. at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). It is well settled that federal magistrate judges are inferior officers under 
Article II. Id. Nevertheless, even if there were no similarities between the two, “[d]e 
[n]ovo review does not mean that the ALJ’s recommended decisions are without 
influence.” Id. at 1143 n.3. 
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However, the court conceded that there were many 
similarities between ALJs and STJs.  Both were “established by 
Law” and statutory provisions determine their “duties, salary, 
and means of appointment.”120  Moreover, both “take testimony, 
conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, 
and . . . enforce compliance with discovery orders.”121  Even with 
those similarities, the court determined that Freytag came out 
the way it did because of the critical final decision making power 
given to the STJs.122  Accordingly, the court held that the FDIC 
ALJ was not an inferior officer subject to the constitutional 
requirements of the Appointments Clause.123 
A concurring opinion argued that the court wrongly 
distinguished STJs from ALJs,124 as no relevant differences 
existed between the two.125  Relying on the Supreme Court 
decision in Edmond v. United States, the concurrence argued 
that whether or not ALJs can render final decisions should not be 
dispositive because inferior officers have their work “directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”126  In conclusion, the concurring opinion argued that 
because ALJs are supervised by the review of the FDIC Board 
members, who are Article II principle agents, they are inferior 
officers.127 
3. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Board 128: Dual-Layer Tenure Protection of Inferior Officers 
Once a group is designated as inferior officers, the next 
question is whether an inferior officer’s dual-layer tenure 
protection unconstitutionally insulates the position from 
Presidential control.129  In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court 
examined whether “the President [is] restricted in his ability to 
 
120 Id. at 1133 (majority opinion) (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 
(1991). See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57, 3105, 5372 (2012). 
121 Id. at 1134 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See id. at 1140 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
125 Id. at 1141. 
126 Id. at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)). 
127 Id. at 1143. 
128 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
129 Id. at 492. 
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remove a principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability 
to remove an inferior officer, even though that inferior officer 
determines the . . . laws of the United States.”130  The Court held 
that such dual-layer tenure protection ran contrary to Article II, 
emphasizing that the President’s judgment should not be 
hindered by a principal officer’s difference of opinion.131 
The Supreme Court found that the five members, who 
together made up the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (the “Board” or “PCAOB”), were indeed inferior officers.132  
The Court comprehensively laid out PCAOB’s authority: 
The Board is charged with enforcing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
the securities laws, the Commission’s rules, its own rules, and 
professional accounting standards.  To this end, the Board may 
regulate every detail of an accounting firm’s practice, including 
hiring and professional development, promotion, supervision of 
audit work, the acceptance of new business and the 
continuation of old, internal inspection procedures, [and] 
professional ethics rules.133 
PCAOB did not require supervision to promulgate auditing or 
ethical standards, perform routine inspections of all accounting 
firms, or initiate formal investigations and disciplinary 
proceedings.134  The Board was also able to issue “severe 
sanctions” in its disciplinary hearings, including money penalties 
of fifteen million dollars.135  Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
placed the Board under the SEC’s oversight, particularly in the 
context of issuing sanctions, the Board possessed significant 
discretion that was insulated from the SEC’s control.136 
Since PCAOB members were inferior officers, the Court 
proceeded to the dual-layer tenure protection issue.  Removal 
protections offered to both SEC Commissioners and PCAOB 
members led to the multi-tiered protection.137  Though SEC 
 
130 Id. at 483–84. 
131 Id. at 484. 
132 Id. at 510. The five-member Board is appointed by the SEC to staggered five-
year terms. Id. at 484. Although the Board members themselves are considered 
inferior officers, the PCAOB was created as a private “nonprofit corporation,” 
allowing the Board to recruit employees from the private sector. Id. at 484–85 (citing 
15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (b), (f)(4), 7219 (2012)). 
133 Id. at 485 (citation omitted). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 486. 
137 Id. at 495–96. 
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“Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President 
except [for] . . . ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office,’ ”138 the issue is whether the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which enabled the Commissioners to remove 
Board members in “limited instances for willful misconduct or 
unreasonable failure to enforce certain rules and standards,”139 is 
constitutional.  Thus, because Article II of the Constitution states 
that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America,”140 an accounting firm registered with 
the Board argued that PCAOB’s multi-tiered protection removed 
the President’s control over the Board members by requiring the 
approval of the Commission.141 
The Court held that this added level of protection “chang[ed] 
the nature” of the President’s control.142  Its concern was that the 
President could not simply hold the Board accountable if there 
was a disagreement with any of the Board’s determinations, but 
rather, he could only hold the Commission accountable.143  
Accordingly, the Court found that PCAOB’s tenure protection 
provision was unconstitutional.144  The majority made clear its 
decision was not controlling on other inferior officers; its 
conclusion was specifically tailored to the President’s control over 
PCAOB—“the regulator of first resort and the primary law 
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy.”145 
Justice Breyer—joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor—dissented on the ground that two layers of 
protection would not impose any more serious limitation upon 
the President than a single layer of protection would impose.146  
 
138 Id. at 487 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 
(1935)). The Court did not prevent Congress from providing “good-cause tenure” to 
principal officers of independent agencies. Id. at 493. In addition to regulatory 
commissions invented during the Progressive Era, independent agencies were also 
created during the New Deal Era. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing 
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770–71 
(2013) (“[T]he purpose of these agencies’ structural features was . . . to foster[] 
independence from the President.”). 
139 Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1349, 1350 (2012). 
140 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
141 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487. 
142 Id. at 496. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 492. 
145 Id. at 507–08. 
146 Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The dissent’s unease stemmed from the statutory provisions of 
the PCAOB, which illustrated that the SEC had authority over 
the Board’s investigatory power.147  Therefore, Justice Breyer 
argued that since the SEC had control over the Board and the 
President had control over the Commissioners, “then, as a 
practical matter, the President’s control over the Board should 
prove sufficient as well.”148  Additionally, the dissent asserted 
that PCAOB’s creation in response to “a series of celebrated 
accounting debacles”149 created a strong justification to insulate 
PCAOB members from “losing their jobs due to political 
influence.”150 
Moreover, the dissent noted that the majority was vague in 
concluding that such unconstitutional dual-layer protection 
would apply to all inferior officers.151  Indeed, the majority 
opinion even expressed that it was certain the ruling pertained to 
the PCAOB.152  The dissent was also troubled by how the Court 
would apply its holding to other government personnel 
designated as inferior officers,153 “putting their job security and 
their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at 
risk.”154 
 
147 Id. at 528–29. Pursuant to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the dissent listed six 
reasons why the Commission had full authority: (1) a PCAOB rule could not take 
effect without the Commission’s approval; (2) the Commission can “ ‘abrogate, delete 
or add to’ any [PCAOB] rule” so long as it furthered the purpose of the securities and 
accounting-oversight laws; (3) it can “enhance, modify, cancel, reduce, or require the 
remission of” any sanction the Board imposed; (4) it can restrict PCAOB’s inspection 
and investigation power; (5) it can conduct its own investigation within PCAOB; and 
(6) it can relieve the Board of any responsibility if doing so is in the best interest of 
the public. Id. (alterations omitted). 
148 Id. at 530. 
149 Id. at 484 (majority opinion). 
150 Id. at 531 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 536. 
152 Supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
153 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent listed 
all the Supreme Court decisions that attempted to define the term “inferior officer,” 
depicting complete ambiguity in the term. Id. at 539–40. Moreover, the dissent also 
included the numerous government positions that the Supreme Court determined to 
be officers. Id. at 540. Among other positions, the dissent also included the FCC’s 
managing director, the FTC’s secretary, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission’s general counsel, and more generally, bureau chiefs, general counsels, 
and administrative law judges, as inferior officers. Id. 
154 Id. at 541. 
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II. FINANCIAL DEFENDANTS SEEK EQUITABLE REMEDY USING 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
SEC administrative proceedings have become the buzz 
around the financial industry throughout 2015.155  Because Dodd-
Frank casted a wide net for SEC administrative proceedings—
keeping financial defendants out of federal court—these 
defendants sought to cure their inability to engage in discovery 
and to expand the compressed hearing schedule set forth in the 
Rules of Procedure.156  In response, defense lawyers asserted that 
administrative proceedings are unconstitutional pursuant to 
Article II because (1) ALJs are inferior officers who are not 
appointed by heads of departments and (2) ALJs’ accountability 
is insulated from two layers of tenure protection that hinders 
Presidential removal.157 
A. Article II’s Impact on the SEC 
Federal courts are inundated with cases that seek an answer 
to the constitutionality of SEC-hired ALJs.  District courts have 
taken different approaches on this issue, and there is also a 
recent split of authority among the Tenth and D.C. Circuit 
Courts.158  However, other courts concluded that they lack 
jurisdiction.159  Moreover, district courts rarely reached the 
 
155 See generally Jean Eaglesham, SEC Fights Challenges to Its In-House 
Courts, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-fights-
challenges-to-its-in-house-courts-1434927977; Henning, supra note 78. 
156 See Molly M. White & Louis D. Greenstein, SEC Proposes To Amend Rules 
Governing Administrative Proceedings, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/united 
states/x/431430/Securities/SEC+Proposes+to+Amend+Rules+Governing+Administra
tive+Proceedings (last updated Oct. 2, 2015). 
157 See Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Appointments Clause 
Problem with ALJs, REUTERS BLOG (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2015/06/17/why-the-sec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-with-
aljs. 
158 Compare Lucia II, 832 F.3d 277, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that “there is 
no indication Congress intended [SEC ALJs] to be synonymous with ‘Officers of the 
United States’ under the Appointments Clause”), with Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 
1168, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (“SEC ALJs 
carry out ‘important functions,’ and ‘exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the 
laws of the Untied States.’ The SEC’s power to review its ALJs does not transform 
them into lesser functionaries. Rather, it shows the ALJs are inferior officers 
subordinate to the SEC commissioners.”). 
159 See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1237 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding “it ‘fairly 
discernible’ from the review scheme provided in 15 U.S.C. § 78y that Congress 
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double-layer tenure protection issue because enforcement action 
defendants were able to prevail on proving a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits using only the Appointments 
Clause issue.160 
1. Federal District Court Decisions 
Although the D.C. Circuit Court in Landry v. FDIC was the 
first appellate court to issue a decision in connection with the 
appointment of ALJs,161 the district courts in the Southern 
District of New York and Northern District of Georgia are also 
familiar with these issues.162 
In the Northern District of Georgia, Judge May ruled on 
whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers to determine if the 
appointment of the ALJs violated Article II.163  Despite the 
Eleventh Circuit vacating and remanding her judgment with 
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,164 this Note uses 
Judge May’s findings to substantiate the inferior officer 
constitutional issue.  In Hill, the SEC brought an insider trading 
case pursuant to § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act against a 
self-employed real estate developer—an individual who was 
unregistered with the SEC.165  The SEC sought a cease-and-
desist order, a civil penalty, and disgorgement.166 
The district court adopted the Freytag analysis to illustrate 
that ALJs are categorized as inferior officers.167  The court found 
that ALJs (1) exercise “significant authority;” (2) are established 
by law with statutory “duties, salary, and means of 
appointment;” and (3) are permanent employees that “take 
testimony, conduct trial, rule on the admissibility of evidence, 
 
intended the respondents’ claims to be resolved first in the administrative forum”); 
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that Congress intended the 
SEC’s administrative scheme “to preclude district court jurisdiction” (quoting Elgin 
v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2131 (2012))). 
160 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and 
remanded 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
161 See supra Section I.D.2 (explaining the Landry decision that FDIC ALJs are 
employees and not subject to Article II constitutional constraints). 
162 See generally Duka v. SEC (Duka II), No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL 
5547463 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297. 
163 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1316–19. 
164 825 F.3d at 1252. 
165 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1301. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1317. 
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and . . . issue sanctions.”168  The court, however, conceded that 
ALJs do not have final order authority to the same degree as 
STJs in Freytag.169  Even so, the court distinguished Landry—
which held FDIC ALJs are mere employees due to their inability 
to render final decisions170—and concluded that the powers of 
STJs were “nearly identical” to those of the ALJs.171  Finally, it 
rejected the Commission’s argument that since Congress 
established by statute that ALJs are hired through the Office of 
Human Resources, and because Congress is aware of the 
Appointments Clause, ALJs must be employees.172  Rather, the 
court found it would be unconstitutional for “Congress 
[to] . . . ’decide’ an ALJ is an employee, but then give [the ALJ] 
the powers of an inferior officer.”173 
Just as in Hill, the Southern District of New York 
(“S.D.N.Y.”) in Duka v. SEC concluded that SEC-hired ALJs are 
inferior officers.174  The Duka court quoted the reasoning and 
holding from Judge May’s opinion in Hill.175  Both courts 
analogized ALJs to the STJs in Freytag and thus, disagreed with 
the D.C. Circuit’s outcome in Landry.176 
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit also weighed in on the issue.177  Unlike the circuit court’s 
reasoning in Landry that focused primarily on the SEC ALJ’s 
lack of final decision-making power, the Bandimere court found 
 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 1318, 1318 n.10. 
170 See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text. 
171 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1318. 
172 Id. at 1319. 
173 Id. Judge May, however, did not definitively conclude that the Appointments 
Clause was violated by the inferior office status of ALJs. Rather, she decided that 
because “SEC ALJ[s] [were] not appointed by the President, a department head, or 
the Judiciary,” the ALJ’s “appointment [was] likely unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis 
added). The court also did not decide on the second constitutional issue regarding 
dual tenure protections. Id. at 1319 n.12. 
174 Duka II, No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL 5547463, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
17, 2015) (“[ALJs] ‘exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States,” ’ their positions are ‘established by law,’ their ‘duties, salary, and means of 
appointment for that office are specified by statute,’ and, in the course of carrying 
out their ‘important functions,’ . . . ALJs ‘take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the 
admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery 
orders.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
175 Duka v. SEC (Duka I), No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL 4940057, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015). 
176 Id. at *2 (“The Court is aware that Landry v. FDIC . . . is to the contrary.”). 
177 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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that final decision-making power is just one factor to consider,178 
as the inferior officer-mere employee distinction should hinge on 
the ALJs duties as a whole.179  In addition to finding that SEC 
ALJs are established by the APA and “receive career 
appointments,”180 the court found that they “exercise significant 
discretion in performing ‘important functions,’ ” such as 
(1) making credibility findings, (2) “issu[ing] initial decisions that 
declare respondents liable and impose sanctions,” and 
(3) “sett[ing] aside, mak[ing] permanent, limit[ing], or 
suspend[ing] temporary sanctions that the SEC itself has 
imposed.”181  Therefore, just like the United States Supreme 
Court held in Freytag, the Tenth Circuit found SEC ALJs to be 
inferior officers whose hiring process violates the Appointments 
Clause.182 
However, a second S.D.N.Y. judge, in Tilton v. SEC, never 
reached the Article II constitutional issues for procedural 
reasons.183  Unlike Landry, where the D.C. Circuit’s judicial 
review of the constitutionality of those proceedings occurred after 
the administrative proceedings, the Tilton case was still at the 
administrative level, preventing the court of appeals from 
reviewing it until after the SEC rendered a final decision.184  
Therefore, the court declined to preside over the constitutional 
claims because it found that it did not have jurisdiction over the 
parties.185 
In addition, all four cases acknowledged that SEC ALJs are 
not appointed by the Commissioners.  The recent Duka I decision 
also highlighted the disclosures made by the SEC in a separate 
case, In re Timbervest,186 which outlined the hiring process of its 
ALJs.  Specifically, the affidavit illustrated that the 
Commissioners did not have any impact or governance over the 
ALJ selection process.187  Accordingly, in the event ALJs are 
 
178 Id. at 1183–84. 
179 Id. at 1182. 
180 Id. at 1179. 
181 Id. at 1180–81. 
182 Id. at 1182–83 
183 No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 WL 4006165, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015), 
aff’d, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016). 
184 Id. at *6. 
185 Id. at *13. 
186 See Duka I, 2015 WL 4940057, at *2. 
187 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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inferior officers, there is a clear violation of the Appointments 
Clause and Congress will have to alter the SEC’s appointment 
procedure to come within constitutional boundaries. 
2. Recent SEC “Final” Decisions 
In stark contrast from federal courts, the SEC came down 
with two final decisions that fought against the notion that its 
ALJs are inferior officers.  First, in In re Raymond J. Lucia 
Companies, Inc.,188 the SEC held that “a Commission ALJ is a 
‘mere employee’—not an ‘officer’—and thus the appointment of a 
Commission ALJ is not covered by the Clause.”189  The SEC 
supported its conclusion with the same reasoning that reiterated 
the holding in Landry.190  The Commission found that since ALJs 
cannot render final decisions, they function “as aides who assist 
the Board in its duties, not officers who exercise significant 
authority independent of . . . supervision.”191  In addition, it 
reasoned that ALJs’ status differed from STJs’ status in Freytag 
because STJs render final decisions in “significant, fully-litigated 
proceedings.”192  The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, which denied petition to review the SEC’s Lucia decision, 
further held: 
[T]he Commission could have chosen to adopt regulations 
whereby an ALJ’s initial decision would be deemed a final 
decision of the Commission . . . without any additional 
Commission action.  But that is not what the Commission has 
done. . . . First, it has afforded itself additional time to 
determine whether it wishes to order review even when no 
petition for review is filed.  Second, upon deciding not to order  
 
 
188 Lucia I, Release No. 4190, 2015 WL 5172953 (S.E.C. Sept. 3, 2015). The D.C. 
Circuit denied the petition to review the SEC’s decision. Lucia II, 832 F.3d 277, 277 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
189 Lucia I, 2015 WL 5172953, at *2, 21. 
190 The D.C. Circuit Court held that even though Landry “did not resolve the 
constitutional status of ALJs for all agencies . . . [it] is the law of the circuit.” Lucia 
II, 832 F.3d at 286 (citations omitted) (determining that “the Commission’s 
regulations on the scope of its ALJ’s authority are no less controlling than the FDIC 
regulations to which [the D.C. Circuit] looked in Landry”). 
191 Lucia I, 2015 WL 5172953, at *21. The D.C. Circuit Court noted, “[T]he main 
criteria for drawing the line between inferior Officers and employees . . . are (1) the 
significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in 
reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions.” Lucia II, 832 F.3d at 
284 (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
192 Lucia I, 2015 WL 5172953, at *23. 
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review, the Commission issues an order stating that it has 
decided not to review the initial decision and setting the date 
when the sanctions, if any, take effect.193 
Second, in In re Timbervest, LLC,194 the SEC bolstered its 
reasoning it previously used in In re Raymond J. Lucia 
Companies, Inc.  The Commission found that an SEC registered 
investment adviser wrongly argued the differences between 
FDIC ALJs in Landry and SEC ALJs, as it did no more than 
illustrate a mere difference in terminology.195  Thus, the 
Commission again thought it was appropriate to distinguish SEC 
ALJs from STJs: (1) ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo; (2) ALJ 
decisions are not final unless the Commission says otherwise; 
and (3) ALJs cannot enforce subpoenas without “an order from a 
federal district court to compel compliance.”196  Accordingly, the 
SEC found that ALJs cannot be considered officers for the 
purpose of Article II.197 
In In re Timbervest, the SEC also concluded on the dual for-
cause tenure protection issue.198  The Commission distinguished 
ALJs from PCAOB Board members in Free Enterprise Fund.  It 
noted that the Court turned on the fact that the PCAOB tenure 
structure ran “contrary to ‘Article II’s vesting of the executive 
power in the President,’ including the President’s obligation to 
‘ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.’ ”199  The 
Commission determined that the Supreme Court did not 
establish a categorical rule prohibiting two layers of for-cause 
removal.200  Therefore, the Commission rephrased the relevant 
issue to “whether the removal restrictions [on SEC-hired ALJs] 
[were] of such a nature that they imped[ed] the President’s 
ability to perform his constitutional duty.”201 
The Commission cited four reasons for concluding that the 
dual-layer tenure protection did not infringe on Presidential 
removal powers.202  First, the Court in Free Enterprise Fund 
 
193 Lucia II, 832 F.3d at 286 (citations omitted). 
194 Release No. 4197, 2015 WL 5472520, at *1 (S.E.C. Sept. 17, 2015). 
195 Id. at *25. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at *26. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 496 (2010)). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at *27. 
202 Id. at *27–28. 
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found that the Commission’s decision does not apply to 
independent agency employees, as that would not trigger a 
separation of powers problem.203  Second, even if ALJs were 
considered officers, PCAOB Board members have duties 
drastically different from ALJs—they were “ ‘empowered to take 
significant enforcement actions’ and engage in the ‘daily exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.’ ”204  Third, different from ALJs who 
are subject to immediate SEC review, the “PCAOB had 
‘significant independence in determining its priorities and 
intervening in the affairs of regulated firms . . . without 
Commission preapproval or direction.’ ”205  Finally, the Supreme 
Court was concerned about the PCAOB’s lack of historical 
precedent, not knowing its effect on Presidential authority; this 
is not the case for the ALJ system, which “has been working 
effectively for almost 70 years.”206  In consequence, the 
Commission rejected the dual-layered tenure protection claim 
against its ALJs.207 
B. The Impact of Article II Claims on Independent Agencies 
Outside the SEC 
As noted in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, 
there are twenty-eight agencies that, together, employ a total of 
1,584 ALJs.208  Therefore, it is likely that other agencies will look 
to the SEC ALJ controversy to see how it will affect their own use 
of ALJs.  Likewise, it also makes sense to look to see how other 
independent agencies addressed this issue, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”). 
 
 
 
203 Id. at *27. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 505 (2010)). 
206 Id. at *28. 
207 Id. 
208 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 586 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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1. How the FTC Handled Constitutional Challenges Against Its 
ALJs 
The FTC recently issued a final decision in In re LabMD, 
Inc.209  Corporations subject to FTC regulations challenged that 
the FTC’s administrative proceedings were unconstitutional 
pursuant to the Appointments Clause.210  During the enforcement 
procedure, the FTC remained in full control over the 
adjudication, even after it assigned the action to a Commission-
employed ALJ.211  Analogous to SEC enforcement action 
processes, FTC ALJs issue initial decisions, the FTC conducts de 
novo review, and then adopts ALJ decisions in whole, in part, or 
set aside altogether.212  Ultimately, the FTC held that its ALJs 
were mere employees of the Commission due to their limited 
authority.213 
However, the FTC added an additional conclusion.  It held 
that, in the event its ALJ is considered an inferior officer, the 
head of the FTC—an Article II principal agent—“ratified Judge 
Chappell’s appointment as an [FTC ALJ] and as the 
Commission’s Chief [ALJ].”214  The FTC made exactly the “quick 
fix” that Judge May had originally suggested the SEC take.215  In 
effect, although the FTC concluded its ALJ was not an inferior 
officer, it endured the extra step to potentially cure subsequent 
Appointments Clause challenges made by FTC-regulated 
corporations. 
 
209 No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *1 (F.T.C. Sept. 14, 2015). 
210 Id. The FTC also referenced the Buckley definition of inferior officer—“one 
who exercis[es] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per 
curiam)). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at *2. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix To Ward Off ALJ 
Constitutional Challenges, REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/ 
alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitution 
al-challenges. 
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2. Legislation Answering the PTO ALJ Appointments Clause 
Issue 
In 2008, Congress amended Title 35 of the United States 
Code and the Trademark Act of 1946.216  The amendment was in 
response to the growing concerns raised against the 
constitutionality of the Director of the PTO who appointed the 
Administrative Patent and Trademark Judges (collectively, 
“APJs”).217  As part of a legislative change in 2000, the law 
provided that APJs were to be appointed by the Director of the 
PTO, rather than by the Secretary of Commerce—the 
department head who was initially authorized to appoint such 
officers.218  However, after eight years of litigating the 2000 
amendment, Congress thought it was necessary to change the 
law again.219  Congress argued that, because intellectual property 
has a significant impact on the U.S. economy, and the success of 
the industry has been largely due to protections afforded to 
industry players, the amended appointment of APJs was wholly 
justified to remove any doubts that the appointments were 
unconstitutional.220  Indeed, for there to be a constitutional 
concern with the appointor of the APJs, it is inferred that 
Congress categorized APJs to be inferior officers and appointed 
by department heads.221 
To cure the constitutional dilemma, Congress enacted a 
three-part plan.222  First, the Secretary of Commerce became the 
department head authorized to make the appointment.223  
Second, the Secretary was permitted to “retroactively appoint 
 
216 Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 110–313, § 1, 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15 
(2008) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)). 
217 154 CONG. REC. 16,853 (2008). The D.C. Circuit held in dicta that APJs are 
inferior officers on grounds that they are like STJs of the Tax Court in Freytag. 
Stryker Spine v. Biedermann Motech GmbH, 684 F. Supp. 2d 68, 84, 84 n.15 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). APJs are officers “established by Law” and have the power to “run trials, 
take evidence, rule on admissibility, and compel compliance with discovery orders.” 
John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 904, 907 (2009) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 41.125 (2016)). However, unlike SEC 
ALJs, APJs are members of the appeals board, and thus are authorized by law to 
render final decisions for the PTO. Id. 
218 Stryker Spine, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000)). 
219 Id. 
220 154 CONG. REC. 16853 (2008). 
221 See id. at 16853–54. 
222 Id. at 16853. 
223 Id. 
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administrative judges who have been acting as de facto judges.”224  
Third, the bill gave a defense to these de facto judges to counter 
challenges made against their decisions that were submitted 
before their constitutional reappointment.225  The latter two 
prongs were added because Congress was concerned with those 
hundreds of decisions rendered pre-enactment by de facto judges, 
which would have been “constitutionally suspect if challenged.”226  
To “ensure certainty in the market and to end unnecessary 
litigation,” Congress explicitly addressed these concerns with the 
de facto officer doctrine: “empower[ing] the Secretary to ‘deem’ or 
ratify all the appointments made by the PTO Director,” and 
creating the defense to make all those decisions submitted by de 
facto judges immune from collateral attack.227  These proposals 
became law on August 12, 2008.228 
III. A FIX TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUARREL 
SEC-hired ALJs are indeed inferior officers, and not mere 
employees.  Thus, the SEC Commissioners, as established 
department heads, will be the officers responsible for appointing 
ALJs.  Moreover, although considered inferior officers, SEC 
ALJs’ dual-layer protection does not impose any significant 
limitation on Presidential powers. 
A. SEC ALJs Are Inferior Officers 
Inferior officer has no concrete meaning other than the 
inconclusive language of the Appointments Clause.  Due to this 
inconclusive language, the term “inferior officer” has been best 
construed to mean “[a] United States officer appointed by the 
President, by a court, or by the head of a federal department” and 
“[a]n officer who is subordinate to another officer.”229 
 
 
224 Id. (emphasis added). A de facto judge is defined as “[a] judge operating 
under color of law but whose authority is procedurally defective, such as a judge 
appointed under an unconstitutional statute.” De Facto Judge, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
225 154 CONG. REC. 16853 (2008). 
226 Id. at 16854. 
227 Id. at 16853–54. 
228 Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 110–313, § 1, 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15 
(2008) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)). 
229 Inferior Officer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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The SEC-hired ALJs are inferior officers as defined by the 
United States Supreme Court, rather than mere employees.  
First, in Buckley v. Valeo,230 the Supreme Court described 
“Officer of the United States” to include “any appointee 
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States.”231  The Court further acknowledged that 
“Officer,” as used in Article II, was defined to be an inclusive 
term.232  As support, the Court emphasized that it had previously 
established inferior officers to include “postmaster[s]”233 and 
“clerk[s] of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”234  Both positions involved an 
individual that reported directly to an officer appointed by the 
President.  In the first case, postmasters were “responsible for a 
local branch of the post office”235 and were beneath the 
Postmaster General—“[t]he head of the U.S. Postal Service.”236  
In the second case, a clerk was appointed, supervised, and 
removed by the judge he or she was hired to assist in the United 
States District Court.237  In addition, as argued in Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court 
previously categorized, among other positions, clerks in the 
Department of the Treasury, assistant-surgeons and cadet-
engineers appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, election 
monitors, federal marshals, and military judges as inferior 
officers.238 
To further expand the inferior officer term, in Edmond v. 
United States,239 Justice Scalia reengineered the earlier four-
prong “officer” test in Morrison v. Olson240 with a simpler model 
that emphasized whether or not the individual had a 
supervisor.241  In particular, Justice Scalia held, “[I]n the context 
 
230 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
231 Id. at 126. 
232 Id. 
233 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 60 (1926). 
234 Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 225, 225 (1839). 
235 Postmaster, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
236 Postmaster General, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
237 See Hennen, 38 U.S. at 226. 
238 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
239 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
240 487 U.S. 654, 671–73 (1988). 
241 Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New 
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (1998) (citing 
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662). 
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of [the Appointments Clause] . . . we think it evident that 
‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”242  By making this determination, the Edmond Court 
found Military Appeals Court judges to be inferior officers 
because they were monitored by the Judge Advocate General and 
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.243  Indeed, Justice 
Scalia went further to conclude that “[b]ased on this 
supervision . . . [Military] Appeals Court judges ‘have no power to 
render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless 
permitted to do so by other Executive officers.’ ”244 
Second, the SEC and enforcement action defendants have 
analogized SEC ALJs to or distinguished them from STJs in the 
Freytag decision.  However, Justice Blackmun’s decision found 
STJs to be inferior officers not because they can render decisions 
of the Tax Court under §§ 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3), and (c), but 
because they perform “more than ministerial tasks.”245  In 
addition to the Court’s emphasis on STJs being “established by 
Law” and holding statutory “duties, salary, and means of 
appointment,” the Court ultimately concluded that STJs “take 
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, 
and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery 
orders”—all of which are “exercise[ed] [with] significant 
discretion.”246 
To this end, even though the court in Landry might find the 
line between mere employees and inferior officers to be anything 
but bright, the line between inferior officers and SEC-hired ALJs 
is nonexistent.  In particular, the SEC stated in each of its final 
decisions: “[T]he Commission’s ALJs conduct hearings, take 
testimony, rule on admissibility of evidence, and issue 
subpoenas.”247  SEC ALJs can also issue sanctions,248 administer 
 
242 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663. 
243 See Bravin, supra note 241, at 1118. 
244 Id. at 1119 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665). 
245 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991). 
246 Id. 
247 Timbervest, LLC, Release No. 4197, 2015 WL 5472520, at *24 (S.E.C. Sept. 
17, 2015); Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (Lucia I), Release No. 4190, 2015 WL 
5172953, at *22 (S.E.C. Sept. 3, 2015). 
248 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 201.180 (2016). 
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oaths,249 and take depositions.250  As Freytag and Edmond made 
clear, although ALJs only issue initial decisions as opposed to 
final decisions, such reason does not effectively impact the 
inferior officer designation.251  This idea was also delineated in 
Landry’s concurring opinion:  “The fact that an ALJ cannot 
render a final decision and is subject to the ultimate supervision 
of the FDIC shows only that the ALJ shares the common 
characteristics of an ‘inferior Officer.’ ”252 
Accordingly, to hold that SEC-hired ALJs are not inferior 
officers would go against Supreme Court principles.  Although 
ALJs can be distinguished from STJs in many ways, the principle 
similarities they do share are the ones that consider them 
inferior officers.  SEC ALJs have statutory roots, well-established 
duties, and discretion within the SEC, despite them being placed 
under the Commission’s supervision. 
B. SEC Commissioners Shall Appoint ALJs and Endure the 
Protections of the De Facto Officer Doctrine 
An immediate effect of ALJs being inferior officers is that 
they are subject to restrictions of the Appointments Clause.  The 
SEC indicated that “[i]t is undisputed that [its ALJs were] not 
appointed by the President, the head of a department, or a court 
of law.”253  SEC ALJ Elliot added that he simply sent in his 
resume, was offered an interview, and received the job.254  The 
hiring process was disconnected from the Commission; it did not 
issue an order appointing Judge Elliot as an ALJ.255  As a result, 
the most effective constitutional resolution, despite some 
criticism against it, is to follow Judge May’s “simple fix”256 and 
 
249 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(1) (2012). 
250 Id. § 556(c)(4); see also Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179–81 (10th Cir. 
2016). 
251 See supra Section I.D.1. 
252 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
253 Timbervest, LLC, Release No. 4197, 2015 WL 5472520, at *23 (S.E.C. Sept. 
17, 2015); Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (Lucia I), Release No. 4190, 2015 WL 
5172953, at *21 (S.E.C. Sept. 3, 2015). 
254 Trial Transcript Day 19 at. 4472–73, Bebo, File No. 3-16293 (S.E.C. June 19, 
2015), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/sec-june-23-notice-in-timb 
ervest-administrative-proceeding.pdf. 
255 Id. at 4474. 
256 Ironridge Glob. IV, Ltd. v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2512-LMM, 2015 WL 7273262, 
at *18 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2015) (reaffirming the court’s earlier conclusion that the 
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have the Commission reappoint its five ALJs.257  But, in addition 
to Judge May’s simple fix, this resolution must also contain a 
retroactive de facto judge defense.258 
Defense attorneys representing financial entities explained 
that Judge May’s solution was untenable because any 
reappointment made by the SEC “could be construed as an 
admission that their previous appointments were constitutionally 
unsound.”259  Thus, the attorneys argued that any previous 
decision, or pending case, before an SEC ALJ will be 
constitutionally challenged.260  To the extent these concerns are 
valid, Congress already answered similar concerns in the 2008 
amendment to the Trademark Act of 1946.261  Even if Congress 
does not enact an express de facto defense to safeguard the SEC 
in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, courts will still not 
entertain these claims due to the de facto officer doctrine. 
The de facto officer doctrine was exercised in various 
Supreme Court cases, as discussed herein, to facilitate 
retroactive application.  In Buckley, the Court insisted that the 
Commission’s “inability to exercise certain powers because of the 
method by which its members have been selected should not 
affect the validity of the Commission’s administrative actions and 
determinations.”262  In response to such statement, the Court 
rendered de facto validity.263  Similarly, in Ryder v. United States, 
the Court again acknowledged that “[t]he de facto officer doctrine 
confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the 
color of official title even though it is later discovered that the 
legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is 
deficient.”264 
 
SEC Commissioners should reappoint the ALJs themselves to cure the Appointment 
issue); Frankel, supra note 157. 
257 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), (noting that the 
court’s conclusion appears “unduly technical, as the ALJ’s appointment could easily 
be cured by having the SEC Commissioners issue an appointment”), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
258 See supra notes 220–224 and accompanying text. 
259 See Frankel, supra note 157. 
260 Id. 
261 See supra Section II.B.2. 
262 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam). 
263 Id. 
264 Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995) (citing Norton v. Shelby 
Cty., 118 U.S. 425, 440 (1886)). The Supreme Court adopted such doctrine for the 
very purpose that absurd results would ensue if it were to allow repetitious suits 
that challenged every action taken by an official whose claim to office was called into 
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In Ryder, the Court listed three cases where it previously 
used the de facto officer doctrine, all of which included 
defendants who failed to bring an objection against the judges’ 
unconstitutional appointment at the time of the hearing.265  The 
defendants raised such objection only in response to the judges’ 
ruling against them.266  In all three cases, the Supreme Court 
held that the judges’ holdings were not open to collateral 
attack267 and “[were] not open to question.”268  In contrast, the 
Ryder case, unlike the challengers in the other three cases, had a 
petitioner who raised the constitutionality issue regarding the 
judges’ titles before those very judges and prior to the 
commencement of the action.269  The Court held:  “We think that 
one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of 
the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case is entitled 
to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief 
may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.”270  In sum, the 
Supreme Court encouraged any objections raised against 
unconstitutionally appointed judges; however, the Court also 
made clear that such objections had to be raised before the 
proceedings commenced.  This approach effectively eliminated 
attacks on prior and pending decisions administered by the de 
facto judges. 
Congress enacted this doctrine with respect to APJs within 
the PTO.  Just like the financial industry, the patent and 
trademark industry largely depends on the decisions made by its 
ALJs.271  And, just like the SEC ALJs, APJs were appointed by 
non-Article II-source principal officers.272  To nip the appointment 
issue in the bud, Congress first restored the appointment 
authority in the Secretary of Commerce and second, adopted the 
de facto judge doctrine to both constitutionalize the ALJs’ 
 
question. Id. (citing 63A AM. JUR. 2d, Public Officers and Employees § 578, at 1080–
81 (1984)). 
265 Id. at 181–82 (citing Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891); McDowell v. 
United States, 159 U.S. 596 (1895); Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452 (1899)). 
266 See Ward, 173 U.S. at 455–56; McDowell, 159 U.S. at 601; Ball, 140 U.S. at 
128–29. 
267 See Ward, 173 U.S. at 456; McDowell, 159 U.S. at 601; Ball, 140 U.S. at 128–
29. 
268 McDowell, 159 U.S. at 601. 
269 Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182. 
270 Id. at 182–83. 
271 154 CONG. REC. 16853 (2008). 
272 See id. 
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appointment to the date they were originally appointed and to 
defend against any attacks to prior decisions by making the 
constitutional appointment apply retroactively.273  Indeed, no 
patent and trademark precedent exists that would impugn the 
Legislature’s resolution to the Appointments Clause issue.274  
Therefore, “Congress . . . retains authority to confer validity on 
determinations adjudicated by previously appointed 
[administrative] judges and can look to its 2008 modification of 
the administrative patent-adjudication system as a roadmap for 
success.”275 
In effect, just as Congress answered the constitutional 
concerns in the patent and trademark industry, the financial 
industry can also make these changes to bring it within the 
constitutional scope.  Similar to the Secretary of Commerce—a 
position that satisfies the heads of department—the SEC 
Commissioners also hold Article II-source status.  First, keeping 
the appointment within the SEC makes this resolution practical, 
as any changes made to this agency will certainly have broad 
impacts on other independent agencies.  It would also be 
unrealistic for Congress to change the appointment power of 
ALJs to a third-party, or even to an entirely different branch of 
government.276  Such proposal might suggest that not only will 
the five SEC ALJs be appointed by a third-party, but also the 
remaining 1,500 ALJs from the other agencies. 
Second, although enabling the Commission to appoint their 
own ALJs would seem to invite bias, this will not be the case.  
The selection process is, and always has been, quarterbacked by 
the OPM, the office responsible for administering an objective 
examination that ranks each ALJ applicant.277  From there, the 
Chief SEC ALJ and interview committee select the top three test 
scores and narrow the candidates to the number of ALJs they 
need.278  Instead of subjecting the Chief SEC ALJ’s recommended 
applicant to the Commission’s Office of Human Resources for 
 
273 Id. 
274 Greg Louer, Comment, Copyright at a Crossroad: Why Improper Appointment 
of Copyright Royalty Judges Could Undermine American Copyright Law, and How 
Congress Can Solve the Problem, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 183, 208 (2010). 
275 Id. 
276 For a complete discussion on outer-branch appointment, see Barnett, supra 
note 1, at 832–60. 
277 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
278 See id. 
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final approval, the applicant will be subject to the 
Commissioners’ final approval.  Accordingly, the objective hiring 
process in place at the beginning of the application process 
ensures that the Commissioners can only give final approval of 
the ALJs who were selected for having the best qualifications. 
Once SEC Commissioners constitutionally appoint the 
ALJs—the proposal made by Judge May279—it then becomes of 
utmost importance to make sure these administrative 
proceedings run efficiently and effectively.  Thus, it would 
behoove the SEC to have Congress enact the de facto judge 
doctrine in its administrative enforcement actions.  As a result, 
any prior or pending proceeding conducted by an ALJ who was 
unconstitutionally appointed by the SEC Office of Human 
Resources will not be impaired after the Commission 
constitutionally reappoints its ALJs.  Put differently, this would 
eliminate any invitation for enforcement action defendants to 
bring attacks on prior or pending decisions submitted by de facto 
ALJs.  Consequently, not only will the appointment of SEC ALJs 
be constitutional, but the de facto judge doctrine will answer and 
remedy any initial reservation regarding the potential for an 
increased flux of unnecessary litigation. 
C. Double Layer Protection Afforded to SEC-Hired ALJs Is 
Constitutional 
The second Article II challenge should be upheld as 
constitutional, as multilevel protection from removal granted to 
SEC ALJs is not contrary to the Article’s vesting of executive 
power in the President.  It is determined that independent 
agencies are headed by principal officers who may be removed for 
cause.280  Thus, SEC Commissioners, as principal officers, do not 
violate Article II because they have a single layer of for-cause 
protection.  The issue is within the ALJs’ additional layer of 
protection, which allegedly limits the President’s ability to 
remove an inferior officer. 
First, pursuant to earlier Supreme Court decisions, SEC 
ALJs’ second layer of tenure protection, as inferior officers, is 
constitutional pursuant to Article II.  In United States v. Perkins, 
 
279 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and 
remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
280 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
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the Court held that because Congress gave department heads the 
authority to appoint inferior officers, Congress implied that those 
same department heads are also limited in removing such 
officers, as it is “deem[ed] best for the public interest.”281  Indeed, 
this holding illustrates that it is constitutionally permissible to 
grant principal officers one layer of protection and inferior 
officers their own layer of protection as a safeguard to insulate 
them from improper removal by their department heads. 
Second, Free Enterprise Fund’s holding has no control over 
the dual tenure protection granted to SEC-hired ALJs.  
Notwithstanding its narrow holding that only addressed the 
PCAOB’s added level of protection that deprived the President of 
adequate control,282 the Court emphasized that the PCAOB, 
unlike other inferior officers, had a greater impact on the 
President’s oversight due to the PCAOB’s own superior power.283  
The PCAOB’s executorial-like powers render its tenure 
provisions incompatible with the Constitution’s separation of 
powers principle.  The argument that Free Enterprise Fund is 
analogous to ALJs because they are both inferior officers is 
baseless.  The Court even addressed that its holding does not 
apply to ALJs, because, unlike the PCAOB who enforces, and 
separately, engages in policymaking, ALJs perform strictly 
adjudicative functions that require approval from their 
supervisor—the Commission.284 
Third, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund 
should be embraced as the logical conclusion for ALJs’ 
constitutional dual-layer tenure protection.  He first argued that 
the majority’s reasoning for restriction on Presidential control 
was circular.285  Even though the Court found the Board’s powers 
to be executive in nature, the dissent put forth a list of provisions 
that prove the Commission had complete power over the 
PCAOB.286  Similar to the dissent’s view of the Commission’s 
 
281 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886). 
282 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 
(2010). 
283 See id. at 498. 
284 Id. at 507 n.10. 
285 See id. at 530 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
286 Id. at 528–29. The following includes a list of statutory provisions 
illustrating the SEC’s control over the PCAOB: (1) the SEC must approve each rule; 
(2) the SEC may abrogate, delete or add to any rule promulgated by the PCAOB; 
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power over the Board, the Commission also has absolute control 
over the decisions of ALJs.  Consequently, “if the President’s 
control over the Commission is sufficient, and the Commission’s 
control over the Board [or ALJs] is virtually absolute, then, as a 
practical matter, the President’s control over the Board [or ALJs] 
should prove sufficient as well.”287 
But, assuming the Commission does not have the same type 
of absolute control over the PCAOB as it does with ALJs, Justice 
Breyer highlighted the importance and purpose of having an 
added layer of tenure protection for those inferior officers who 
engage in adjudicatory functions.288  Such functions, in which 
ALJs engage, require the need for an additional for-cause 
removal process to detach those positions from political 
influence.289  Because SEC ALJs can only be removed by the 
Commission for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office,”290 ALJs may decide cases with the correct application of 
securities laws, rather than become burdened with any political 
motives that may emerge. 
In sum, without having to apply the ruling in Free Enterprise 
Fund to the dual-layer tenure protection of SEC-hired ALJs, the 
controlling constitutional standard remains in the Humphrey’s 
Executor decision:  “Congress may constitutionally ‘limit and 
restrict’ the Commission’s power to remove those [inferior 
officers] they appoint.”291  Therefore, the ALJs multilevel tenure 
protection fails to violate the Constitution’s separation of powers, 
as SEC ALJs do not interfere with the Executive’s ability to 
exercise power over inferior officers. 
CONCLUSION 
The ALJ-as-inferior officer debate is paramount to the future 
of SEC enforcement actions.  The controversial provisions of 
Dodd-Frank were the tipping point for SEC regulated and 
unregulated entities.  This prompted enforcement action 
 
(3) the SEC may modify, enhance, cancel or reduce any sanction made by the 
PCAOB; and (4) the SEC may restrict or direct PCAOB’s conduct. Id. 
287 Id. at 530. 
288 See id. (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623–28 
(1935)). 
289 Id. at 531–32. This is another instrument in place to ensure that financial 
defendants receive the very due process they are challenging. 
290 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012). 
291 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 535 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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defendants to challenge their administrative proceedings in 
federal court.  With the heightened use of ALJs, which embodied 
the broader principles of Congress’s proactive steps to regulate 
the financial industry, legislative action must be taken to adjust 
SEC administrative proceedings within the letter of the 
Constitution.  Accordingly, supported by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Appointments Clause, this Note suggests 
that SEC ALJs are inferior officers who shall be appointed by 
SEC Commissioners and have the protections under the de facto 
judge doctrine.  Moreover, this Note concludes that SEC ALJs’ 
multi-tiered tenure protection remains constitutional, as there is 
no basis to support a separation of powers claim. 
